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COMMENTS
THE DEFENDANT IN JEOPARDY-IS VIRGINIA UNIQUE?
The constitutional and statutory safeguards against a person being twice
placed in jeopardy for the same offense are well known both to laymen
and lawyers alike. What has gone largely unnoticed by the Virginia courts
is the applicability of the doctrine of res judicata to the area of criminal
law. It is the purpose of this comment to make the reader aware of the
doctrine of res judicata as it applies to criminal cases and to attempt to
clear up the confusion which has developed in this area of Virginia law.
I.
Jeopardy means the danger of conviction.' The doctrine of former
jeopardy protects the right of a person not to be tried twice for the same
offense by prohibiting a second trial.2 The common law barred a second
trial for the same offense, whether the accused had suffered punishment
or not, if in the first trial he had been acquitted or convicted. The principle
is expressed in the Latin phrase, "Nemo debit bis puneri pro uno delicto." 3
This safeguard against "twice in jeopardy" is provided both by the United
States Constitution 4 and the Virginia Constitution,5 as well as by Virginia
statutes.e
Traditionally, Virginia has held that jeopardy attaches to a defendant
at one of two times. Where the trial is by jury, the defendant is in jeopardy
as soon as the jury has been empaneled and sworn;7 where the trial is by
1See Rosser v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 1028, 167 S.E. 257 (1933).
2 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Perrow, 124 Va. 805, 97 S.E. 820 (1919) and Day v.
Commonwealth, 64 Va. (23 Gratt.) 915 (1873). This rule is also discussed in 2B
MiCe's Jua., Autrefois, Acquit and Convict, § 7 at 339 (1970).
8 See Price v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. (33 Gratt.) 819 (1880).
4 U.S. CoNsr. amend. V.
5 VA. Co Nsr. art. I, § 8.
That in criminal prosecutions a man hath a right to . . . [not] be put twice
in jeopardy for the same offense.
6 VA. CoDE ANN. § 19.1-257-19.1-259 (1950). The principal statute concerning former
jeopardy in Virginia is § 19.1-257:
A person acquitted by the jury upon the facts and merits on a former trial,
may plead such acquittal in bar of a second prosecution for the same offense....
It is noted that while the statute specifically refers to an acquittal by jury, it is equally
applicable to a trial without a jury. See Adkins v. Commonwealth, 175 Va. 590, 9 S.E.2d
349 (1940).
7 Rosser v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 1028, 167 S.E. 257 (1933):
The general rule . . . is that when a person has been placed on trial, on a
valid indictment, before a court of competent jurisdiction, has been arraigned,
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judge without a jury, the defendant is in jeopardy at the instant the court
begins to hear evidence." If one were to stop at this point, Virginia would
clearly be in accord with the majority view as to when jeopardy attaches
to the defendant.9 However, two Virginia cases seem to depart from this
concept of when jeopardy attaches and to establish a new "time in jeopardy"
which is unique to Virginia.
The first, Commonwealtb v. Perrow,'0 involved the violation of an act
passed by the General Assembly which authorized the Board of Supervisors
of Buckingham County to place a license tax upon all labor agents coming
into the county for the purpose of inducing local laborers to leave. Failure
to pay this tax amounted to a misdemeanor. Perrow was charged under
this act, but the warrant was, quashed in the Circuit Court, and he was set
free. In quashing the warrant, the court stated that the statute under which
Perrow had been charged was unconstitutional. The Commonwealth then
sought a writ of error, but the court denied this request.1 ' In so ruling,
the court held that the avowed purpose of the appeal sought by the state
was to obtain a reversal of the judgment, to the end that the accused might
be again brought to trial and that no appeal could lie if the rule against a
second jeopardy was to apply.12 In effect, what the court said was that even
though no jury had been sworn and no evidence had been heard, the de-
fendant had been in jeopardy; and to allow an appeal by the state would
result in the defendant being twice in jeopardy for the same offense. 13
has pleaded, and a jury has been empaneled and sworn, he is in jeopardy. Id. at
1031-32.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Willcox, 111 Va. 849, 69 S.E. 1027 (1911); Dulin v. Lillard,
91 Va. 718, 20 S.E. 821 (1895).
8Rosser v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 1028, 167 S.E. 257 (1933):
In so far as the accused is concerned this danger exists and is -just as real when
he [the defendant] is being tried by the court without a jury as it is when he
[the defendant] is being tried by a jury.... In a trial before a court without a
jury the danger of conviction or jeopardy of an accused begins when the trial
has reached the stage where the Commonwealth begins to introduce its testi-
mony. That stage in such a trial is equivalent to the swearing of the jury when
the accused is tried by jury. Id. at 1036.
o 21 AM. JuR. 2d Criminal Law § 175 (1965); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 241 (1961),:
As a general rule,.... jeopardy attaches only when the trial commences; if the
trial is to a jury, jeopardy attaches when all valid proceedings have been com-
pleted up to and including the swearing of the jury; and if the trial is to the
court without a jury, jeopardy attaches when the court begins to hear the
evidence. Id. at 636.
10 124 Va. 805,97 S. E. 820 (1919).
1i Under the VA. CONsr. art. VI, § 1, the Commonwealth may be granted an appeal
only in a case involving the violation of a law relating to the State revenue.
12 124 Va. at 811.
13 That the Perrow court based its decision on principles of former jeopardy is evi-
dent from the language of the court's decision:
When the purpose of an appeal in a criminal case is to procure on behalf of
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The decision in Perrow remained unnoticed for twenty-one years until
the court in Adkins v. Coinmonvwealth'4 based its conclusions thereon.
In Adkins, an unmarried man was indicted on charges of bigamy and as
an accessory to the crime of bigamy. The defendant demurred to the in-
dictment on the ground that as a matter of law an unmarried man was
not included within the language of the statute defining bigamy and could
not be an accessory to this crime. The trial court erroneously sustained
the demurrer, holding that as a matter of law an unmarried man could not
be an accessory to the crime of bigamy, and ordered that the defendant be
discharged. When arraigned upon a second indictment charging him with
aiding and abetting in the crime of bigamy, the defendant filed a plea of
"autrefois acquit" (former jeopardy). The court, citing Perrow, held
that the plea was good, as the order discharging the accused was an ultimate
decision upon a question of law. 15
Thus, it appears that Perrow and Adkins have established a new time in
jeopardy, holding that jeopardy attaches to the person of the accused
whenever there has been an ultimate decision by the court upon a question
of law, even though no jury has been sworn or evidence admitted.1 Per-
the State a reversal of the judgment and a new trial of the accused ... the rule
against a second jeopardy for the same offense operates proprio vigore to destroy
the right of appeal. Id. at 811.
In setting forth the rule of this case the court stated:
.. T]he spirit and purpose of the immunity intended to be secured by the
doctrine in question will be violated whenever a defendant in any criminal case
has been tried by competent authority . . . and discharged upon a defense con-
stituting a bar to the proceeding, whether that defense be rested upon the law
or the facts. Id. at 815.
Such a rule is clearly contrary to the majority rule, stated in note 9 supra, as to when
jeopardy attaches.
It should be further noted that while the Perrow court speaks in terms of jeopardy,
that same court states a principal of res judicata (collateral estoppel) to support its
decision that the defendant had been twice in jeopardy:
[Als a general rule, the State has no right to a writ of error or an appeal from a
judgment in favor of a defendant, whether upon a verdict of acquittal or upon
the determination by the court of a question of law, unless it be expressly con-
ferred by statute.... Id. at 815.
14 175 Va. 590, 9 S.E.2d 349 (1940).
15 The demurrer was not sustained by the court because the indictment was defective
in form. On appeal it was held that the lower court's ruling on the demurrer was an
ultimate decision upon a question of law and that the decision of Commonwealth v.
Perrow was controlling. 175 Va. at 596.
16As in Perrow, the court in Adkins again evidences confusion in distinguishing
between former jeopardy and res judicata. While speaking in terms of former jeopardy
and citing Perrow as authority, the court proceeds to state in the very next paragraph
a principle of res judicata (collateral estoppel):
A fact once determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in a criminal
proceeding cannot again be litigated between the same parties unless a different
rule applies in criminal proceedings from that which obtains in civil proceedings
[Vol. 7:130
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haps this might be acceptable as a broadening of the doctrine of. former
jeopardy in Virginia, except for the holding in Commonwealth v. Willcox,17
a case decided eight years before Perrow, which went unnoticed both by
Perrow and Adkins.
In the Willcox case, a judge at a primary election was indicted for
knowingly and corruptly causing to be placed upon the official poll books
the name of a person as having voted in said election when that person in
fact had not voted. The defendant appeared and demurred to the indict-
ment, claiming that the statute under which he was indicted was null and
void as repugnant to the constitution. The court sustained the defendant's
demurrer on this ground and dismissed the accused. The Commonwealth
then applied for a writ of error in order to appeal the case, but the court
properly denied this.' However, in setting forth its reason for denying
the writ of error, the court stated that although no writ of error was proper
in the case, the accused, having never been in jeopardy, could be again
indicted and tried for this same offense by the state. 19 Thus, this court,
prior to the holding in Perrow, determined that a final decision upon a
question of law by the court did not amount to jeopardy, a holding con-
tra to both Perrow and Adkins.
At this point it would seem that Virginia is in a hopeless state of con-
fusion as to whether or not the adjudication of a question of law in the
defendant's favor constitutes jeopardy. Yet it seems only fair that the
defendant, having once had a question of law decided in his favor by a
court of competent jurisdiction, should not be subject to a relitigation of
this question. Thus, a dilemma arises because the defendant deserves pro-
tection even though he is not in a position to plead former jeopardy under
but it is well settled that the rule is the same in both classes of cases. 175 Va.
at 597.
To add to the confusion, the rule in Adkins is cited as an annotation to the Vir-
ginia former jeopardy statute, VA. ConE ANN. § 19.1-257 (1950). Also Micmr's Julus-
PRD NcE, the Virginia-West Virginia encyclopedia of law, discusses both Perrow and
Adkins in the section dealing with former jeopardy. See 2B Micma's JuR., Autrefois,
Acquit and Consict, § 7 at 339-40 (1970).
'7 111 Va. 849, 69 S.. 1027 (1911).
18 See note 11 supra, for the reason of the court.
'
9 In rendering its opinion the court stated:
The indictment was demurred to by the defendants, the demurrer was sustained,
and the indictment was dismissed. The accused were never in jeopardy, and may
be again indicted and tried for the offense whereof they are accused, if the
Commonwealth shall be so advised. 111 Va. at 852.
The court then followed the majority rule as to when jeopardy attaches:
And we may say .. . : The accused have never been put upon their trial, nojury has ever been charged with their deliverance, and they have, therefore,
never been in jeopardy with respect to the offense of which they are accused.
ill Va. at 853.
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the two recognized instances as to when it attaches. 20 This dilemma is
resolved by the application of the doctrine of res judicata in the area of
criminal law.
II.
The plea of res judicata should be distinguished from the technical de-
fense of "former acquittal" and "former conviction." These latter defenses
are not based on the doctrine of res judicata, but on the rules against double
jeopardy.21 Although the applicability of the principle of res judicata in
criminal cases has long been recognized, there is reason to believe that its
availability has not been generally appreciated. It appears that in some
jurisdictions the issue has never, or has only recently, been presented to
the courts and that many treatises and casebooks in the field of criminal
law make little or no mention of its importance. 22 It is not the purpose of
this comment to explore completely res judicata as it applies to criminal
cases,28 but rather to make the reader aware of its existence and its possible
application in specific instances when the plea of former jeopardy would
not be applicable.
Although for a long time there was great confusion as to whether the
doctrine of res judicata could be applied to criminal cases, this question
was finally settled by the landmark case of United States v. Oppenheimer.2
In that case the court rejected the contention that the doctrine of res
judicata applied to criminal cases only in the modified form of the protec-
tion against being twice placed in jeopardy. Oppenheimer had been in-
dicted for conspiracy to conceal assets from a trustee in bankruptcy. He
then claimed that the offense was barred by the one year statute of limita-
tions provided for in the bankruptcy act. The trial court erroneously up-
held this defense, and the defendant was released. The state then sought
to reindict the accused after learning that the statute of limitations had
not in fact run, but the Supreme Court held that the decision in the trial
20 See notes 7, 8 and 9 supra.
21 Annot., 9 A.L.R. 3d 203, 210 (1966).
2 2 See Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39 Iowa L. Rxv.
317 (1954).
The question of the applicability of res judicata in the area of criminal law has at-
tracted the attention of many legal writers. See, e.g., Garshenson, Res Judicata in Suc-
cessive Criminal Prosecutions, 24 BRooKLYN L., REv. 12 (1957); Developments in the Law
-Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REv. 818, 874 (1952); Res Judicata and Double Jeopardy in
Indiana Criminal Procedure, 33 IND. L. J. 409 (1958); Res Judicata in Criminal Cases,
27 TE X. L. REv. 231 (1948); Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L. J. 262, at 283-86 (1965).
23For a thorough examination of this subject see materials cited in notes 21 and 22
supra.
24 242 U.S. 85 (1916).
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court below was res judicata as to the issue of law there decided. There
have been later cases following Oppenheimer, all standing for the propo-
sition that the fifth amendment, in providing against double jeopardy, was
not intended to supplant or abrogate in criminal cases the fundamental
common law principle of res judicata.26
Res judicata, as understood in civil cases, may take one of three forms-
merger, bar, or estoppel.27 As applied in criminal cases the primary sig-
nificance of the doctrine of res judicata lies in its operation as collateral
estoppel.28 Collateral estoppel bars relitigation between the same parties of
25 Upon the merits the proposition of the Government is that the doctrine of res
judicata does not exist for criminal cases except in the modified form of the Fifth
Amendment that a person shall not be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; and the conclusion is drawn that a decision upon
a plea in bar cannot prevent a second trial when the defendant never has been
in jeopardy in the sense of being before a jury upon the facts of the offence
charged. It seems that the mere statement of the position should be its own
answer. It cannot be that the safeguards of the person, so often and so rightly
mentioned with solemn reverence, are less than those that protect from a liability
in debt. It cannot be that a judgment of acquittal on the ground of the statute
of limitations is less a protection against a second trial than a judgment upon the
ground of innocence, or that such a judgment is any more effective when en-
tered after a verdict than if entered by the Government's consent before a jury
is empaneled; or that it is conclusive if entered upon the general issue . . .but
if upon a special plea of the statute, permits the defendant to be prosecuted again.
The safeguard provided by the Constitution against the gravest abuses has
tended to give the impression that when it did not apply in terms, there was no
other principle that could. But the Fifth Amendment was not intended to do
away with what in the civil law is a fundamental principle of justice . . . , in
order, when a man once has been acquitted on the merits, to enable the Govern-
ment to prosecute him a second time. 242 U.S. at 87-88.
While Oppenheimer concerned the Court's upholding of the lower court's ruling
that the statute of limitations had run, the Court stated as dicta at p. 87: "We do not
suppose that it would be doubted that a judgment upon a demurrer to the merits would
be a bar to a second indictment in the same words." It is submitted that the rule of
Oppenheimer should have been applied in both Perrow and Adkins, since in both cases
the defendants were never in jeopardy in the classical sense.
26See, e.g., Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426 (1923); United States v. Marakar, 300 F.2d
513 (3d Cir. 1962) vacated on other grounds 370 U.S. 723 (1962); State v. Hentschel, 98
N.H. 382, 101 A.2d 456 (1953).27 Annot., 9 A.L.R3d 203 (1966):
With reference to judgments in civil cases, it has been said that the effect of
a judgment as res judicata appears in at least three aspects. These are: (1)
"merger," by which a judgment for the plaintiff merges his cause of action, so
that the original cause of action is terminated and a cause of action on the judg-
ment takes its place; (2) "bar," by which a judgment on the merits for the
defendant terminates the original cause of action; and (3) "estoppel," by which
questions of fact and perhaps of law actually, litigated in the action are conclu-
sively determined in subsequent actions in which the same questions arise, even
though the cause of action may be different. Id. at 213.
28 Id. at 244.
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issues of law or fact actually determined at a previous trial.29  In most
jurisdictions it is well settled that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is
applicable in criminal cases.30 Although there appears to have arisen some
question among the courts as to whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel
should apply to determinations of questions of law as well as fact, it is
clear that the Supreme Court feels the doctrine should apply to questions of
law as evidenced by its holding in Oppenheimer.81 Therefore, even though
the trial may not have progressed to the normal stages of jeopardy,3 2 or,
more importantly, the previous trial was for a different offense such that a
plea of former jeopardy would be inappropriate, 3 any issue of fact or law
finally decided in the prior proceeding would, by principles of collateral
estoppel, be binding as between the parties.
In Virginia, case authority as to the applicability of collateral estoppel
to criminal cases is sketchy at best, indicating the confusion which has
-29 Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L. J. 262, 283 (1965).
3 0 See, e.g., Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958) (stating that although the doc-
-trine of res judicata was originally developed in connection with civil litigation, it has
been widely employed in criminal cases in both state and federal courts); Sealfon v.
United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948); United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916);
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915); Adams v. United States, 287 F.2d 701 (5th Cir.
1961); Wheatley v. United States, 286 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1961); Cosgrove v. United
States, 224 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1954); United States v. Kaadt, 171 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1948).
31 See, e.g., United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cit. 1961); United States v.
Morse, 24 F.2d 1001 (S.D.N.Y. 1926); State v. Humphrey, 357 Mo. 824, 210 S.W.2d 1002
(1948); People v. Brooklyn and Queens Transit Corp., 283 N.Y. 484, 28 NE.2d 925
(1940); State v. Barton, 5 Wash.2d 234, 105 P.2d 63 (1940). The general rule as to
whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel extends to questions of law is stated in
RE TATEmENT OF JuDGMENTS § 70 (1942):
Where a question of law is actually litigated and determined in an action, the
determination is ordinarily conclusive between the parties in a subsequent action
involving the same subject matter or transaction, although based upon a different
cause of action from that upon which the original action was based. Id. at 320.
32 See note 9 supra.
38 The difference between collateral estoppel and former jeopardy is discussed in
Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 203 (1966):
The doctrine of collateral estoppel by judgment (or verdict) is in some respects
broader and in other respects narrower than the defense of double jeopardy.
While both require identity of parties the plea of collateral estoppel by judgment
(or verdict), as applied in criminal cases, and the defense of double jeopardy
differ in the following respects: (1) the defense of double jeopardy is available
even in the absence of a judgment, but the effect of collateral estoppel ordinarily
attaches only to a judgment; (2) the defense of double jeopardy requires identity
of offenses, but the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not; (3) the defense of
double jeopardy, if successful, operates as a complete bar to another prosecution,
while the defense of collateral estoppel does not necessarily so operate and may
merely preclude the relitigation of certain issues; and (4) the federal and most
state constitutions embody the defense of double jeopardy, whereas it is doubtful
whether the application, in a proper case, of the doctrine of collateral estoppel
is required by any constitutional provision. Id. at 221-22.
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surrounded this area of law. In fact only two cases other than Perrow and
Adkins (which were decided on principles of former jeopardy) have dealt
with this subject. The first case is Justice v. Commonwealth.34 In that case
the court expressed doubt as to whether an estoppel by judgment could
operate in a criminal case:
But the doctrine of estoppel, strictly speaking, is not applicable to
the Commonwealth in a criminal prosecution. The nearest approach
to it is the doctrine, founded on the maxim of the common law, that
no one shall be tvice. put in jeopardy for the same offence.35
Seymour v. Commonwealth3 6 moved Virginia away from the rigid posi-
tion taken by Justice and seemed to leave the question open as to whether
collateral estoppel could apply in criminal cases. The Seymour court held
that, while res judicata or estoppel did not apply in the present case, it
was not prepared to say that no case could possibly arise in which the doc-
trine of estoppel or res judicata could be invoked against the Common-
wealth. 37
This is the way Virginia law stood as to this subject until the court's
decision in Adkins. Although Adkins cited Perrow (which was decided
on principles of former jeopardy) as authority for its holding, at least one
authority has included this case under the doctrine of res judicata as applied
to criminal cases. s Such would seem to indicate that Virginia has moved
one step farther from Seymour and would align itself with those authorities
which hold that collateral estoppel may be applied in criminal cases to
questions of law and fact.
III.
It is most difficult to attempt to summarize the legal ramifications of
Perrow and Adkins in a paragraph. At best, these two cases can be con-
sidered illustrations of hard cases making bad law. In each of these cases
the Virginia court was seeking a way to prevent an injustice. In Perrow
the trial court had determined that a statute was unconstitutional, while in
Adkins the trial court had ruled as a matter of law that an unmarried man
could not be an accessory to bigamy. In each case the state sought to retry
the accused, claiming that the accused had never been in jeopardy. To
allow the state to do this would be unfair, since a final adjudication of a
3481 Va. 209 (1885).
35Id. at 217.
26 133 Va. 775, 112 SE. 806 (1922).
37 Id. at 781.
38
_Annot. 9 AL.R.3d 203 (1966).
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question of law had already been made by the trial court in the defendant's
favor in each case. In groping for a way to protect the rights of the
accused, the court turned to the doctrine of former jeopardy, holding that
both defendants had been in jeopardy and thus a second trial for the same
offense was barred. Yet in rendering such a decision the court made no
mention of the fact that it was overturning not only the majority"0 but
the Virginia rule40 as to when jeopardy attaches. The only explanation is
that these two courts were guilty of a common error-they overlooked the
doctrine of res judicata as applied to criminal cases in the form of collateral
estoppel.
The Willcox case correctly stated the law in holding that the adjudication
of a legal issue in the defendant's favor does not amount to jeopardy.41
Applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel to Perrow and Adkins, the
questions of law decided in the trial courts below would have been barred
from relitigation and the defendants' rights protected. This should have
been the theory of the Perrow and Adkins cases.42 By deciding these cases
on principles of former jeopardy, the courts served only to throw Virginia
law into confusion. It is hoped that both the courts and attorneys in Vir-
ginia will now become fully aware of the doctrine of res judicata as applied
to criminal cases and make use of it, when a plea of former jeopardy is
clearly wrong.
F.T.
39 See note 9 supra.
40 See notes 7 and 8 supra.
41 See note 19 supra.
42 The fact that the courts in both Perrow and Adkins state principles of res judicata
in their decisions lends weight to this conclusion. See notes 13 and 16 supra.
